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RECENT DECISIONS

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - EFFECT OF A V ENDOR's BREACH OF A CoLLATERAL AGREEMENT - The vendor sought specific performance of a land
contract containing the following clause, "On default by the buyer, the binder
shall be retained by the seller, but if the seller shall be unable to make conveyance
as above stipulated then the binder shall be returned and all obligations shall
cease." It was agreed orally by the parties that the vendor would help the
vendee finance the purchase. The vendor did provide the vendee with an application for a mortgage from a bank, but the bank did not promise to take the
mortgage. Held, specific performance should be refused, both because of the
quoted clause, which provided for liquidated damages, and because the plaintiff
breached the collateral agreement to help finance the purchase.1 Gilman v.

Murphy, (R. I. 1941) 21 A. (2d) 272.
The courts are almost universally agreed that a contract provision establishing liquidated damages or providing a penalty for breach of the contract does
not deprive either party of the remedy of specific performance, unless the contract indicates that such a result is intended by the parties. The weight of
authority is against the interpretation of the principal case if the liquidated
damages provision is the basis of the decision. 2 However, since the Rhode

1 The dissenting opinion held that the oral stipulation had been substantially
performed.
2 See 32 A. L. R. 584 at 592 (1924). In Rittenhouse v. Swiecicki, 94 N. J. Eq.
36 at 39, II8 A. 261 (1922), the court stated, "there must be something apart from
the fact that there is a provision for liquidated damages to show that its payment is to
be the equivalent for performance. There must be found in the engagement a contemplated alternative whereby the parties are given an option to perform or to refuse
to perform and pay the specified damages. That alternative engagement is easily expressed, and if relied upon should appear with reasonable clearness and certainty."
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Island court hitherto has adhered to the majority view,8 and since the court
does not purport to overrule any previous cases, the real reason for the denial
of specific performance must be the plaintiff's breach of the collateral agreement
to help finance the defendant's purchase. The court in effect holds that the
substantial fulfillment of a collateral stipulation by the vendor which induces the
vendee to enter into the contract is a condition of the contract the breach of
which precludes the vendor from obtaining specific performance.4 In determining the propriety of the decision, it may be helpful to decide whether a breach
of this collateral stipulation would prevent the vendor from recovering damages
in a law action. Although referred to by the court as a representation, the stipulation probably is not a representation in the strict sense because it is a promise
to perform an act in the future. 5 It would seem that the parties intended performance of the vendor's oral agreement to help the vendee finance the purchase
to be a condition precedent to the vendee's performance, since the vendee probably was unable to carry out the contract unless he received such assistance.
Since the collateral agreement is oral, there is the question whether proof of it
by parol evidence would be excluded in an action at law. If the proof is admitted,
the vendor would not be able to recover damages,6 because he did not fulfill ..
condition precedent to the vendee's obligation to perform.7 Even if recovery is
disallowed at law, should relief also be denied by a court of equity when the
plaintiff made a bona fide attempt to fulfill the condition precedent? It might
be argued that an equity court should grant a conditional decree of specific
performance, the payment of the purchase price being conditioned on the vendor's providing an adequate mortgage 8 to enable the vendee to purchase the
property on the basis originally contemplated.9 A barrier to such a conditional
decree is found in the requirement that for equity to grant specific performance
the contract must be certain in all of its material terms.10 A decree merely
requiring the vendor to arrange for a mortgage would be open to the objection
that the terms of the mortgage might not be acceptable to the vendee. If, on
8
Dike v. Greene, 4 R. I. 285 (1856); Paolilli v. Piscitelli, 45 R. I. 354, 121 A.
531 (1923).
.
4
"Even if complainant's construction of the stipulation were adopted, she would
not be entitled to a decree of specific performance in the circumstances clearly established by the evidence before us, as she herself failed to do equity." Principal case, 21 A.
(2d) 272 at 275.
5
3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 673 (1936).
6
3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 634 (1936): "Accordingly it may be shown
by parol evidence • . . that the parties agreed by parol that the writing in question
should not become effective until some future day or the happening of some contingency, if this is not inconsistent with the express terms of the writing."
7
3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., § 666A (1936).
8
It was probably the intention of the contracting parties that a mortgage was the
type of financial help desired.
9
"One of the great advantages which equity has over common law is that . . •
a decree in equity may be molded in such a way as to give full protection as to the
rights of the parties as set forth in the pleadings and in the evidence." f, PAGE, CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., § 3368 (1922).
10
5 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed., §§ 2186-2189 (764-767)
(1919), 5th ed., § 1405 (1941).

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

the other hand, the court decreed all the particulars of the mortgage which the
vendor was to provide before he could require performance by the vendee, the
court would be making a contract for the parties, contravening an established
principle of equity.11 Nevertheless, a court of equity, if so inclined, could formulate the terms of the mortgage 12 from the surrounding circumstances and
embody it in a conditional decree. The principal case leaves unanswered the
question why the vendee is not bound to return the binder in view of the fact
that the vendor's breach of the collateral agreement is serious enough to prevent
his obtaining specific performance.18

5 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed., § 2190 (768) (1919).
See 30 A. L. R. 572 (1924), for validity and enforceability of provisions for
renewal of lease at rental not determined; 37 A. L. R. 365 (1925), in regard to uncertainty as to terms of mortgage or note contemplated by contract for sale of real
property as affecting right to specific performance; Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285,
209 P. 515 (1922); Lightv. Kleinginna, 107 N. J. Eq. 149,152 A. 1 (1930); Lake
Shore Power Co. v. Village of Edgerton, 43 Ohio App. 545, 184 N. E. 37 (1932);
McCarty v. Harris, 216 Ala. 265, II3 So. 233 (1927). The last case involved a
contract for the sale of land which provided that the purchaser could obtain a first mortgage on the property, but failed to specify the amount of the mortgage. The court
held that the contract was not so uncertain as to warrant refusal of specific performance.
18 The court was not called upon to decide the question because the vendee did
not request a return of the binder.
11
12

